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THE OPTIONAL MEASURES OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES: 
TOWARDS A NEW BANK CRISIS MANAGEMENT PARADIGM?  
Marco Bodellini*  
The role of deposit guarantee schemes is pivotal in banking crises. This role, however, 
should not be limited to only performing the so-called pay-box function. While this is 
deposit guarantee schemes' core function, and, as such, needs to be included in the safety 
net 'armoury' of every jurisdiction, optional interventions, both preventive measures 
and measures in the context of liquidation, can turn out to be more effective, from a 
system-wide perspective, to maintain financial stability and to reduce the destruction 
of value potentially resulting from an atomistic liquidation. Accordingly, the 
implementation of these measures by deposit guarantee schemes should not be hindered, 
but rather facilitated by the legal framework. Each European Union Member State 
should be encouraged (indeed required) to transpose in its domestic regime the 
provisions of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive which deal with deposit 
guarantee schemes' alternative measures, thereby paving the way for a new bank crisis 
management paradigm. Nonetheless, a number of legal obstacles arising from the 
application of state aid rules and from the extension of the depositor preference rule in 
the liquidation process to deposit guarantee schemes, combined with a narrow reading 
of the least cost principle, need to be removed in order for deposit guarantee schemes to 
be able to successfully carry out optional interventions. 
Keywords: deposit guarantee schemes, bank crisis management, resolution, 
liquidation, DGSD, BRRD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) are an important component of the 
banking system safety net. Their core function is to protect depositors in the 
event of their bank becoming 'failing or likely to fail' (FOLF) and being 
liquidated. In such a scenario, by paying out covered depositors, they 
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contribute to maintaining the stability of the banking system, thereby 
avoiding that the insolvency of one bank can be transmitted to other 
institutions, which could give rise to widespread failures that can lead to a 
systemic crisis.1 This typically happens when banks' debt-holders suddenly 
request their banks to convert their debt instruments into cash to such an 
extent that the latter become unable to do so due to the so-called maturity 
mismatch, that is an important feature of commercial banking. Commercial 
banks mainly take deposits from the public and make loans. Deposits are, as 
a consequence, the most common form of financing for commercial banking 
institutions. The main characteristic of deposits is that they are 
withdrawable on demand, which makes them short-term liabilities. 
Typically, banks hold only a fractional amount of the overall value of the 
deposits they take and use the remaining part to make loans. The reason for 
this is that using deposits to extend loans, by charging higher interests on 
their borrowers, is their way to make profits. However, the issue in doing so 
is that whereas deposits are short-term liabilities, loans usually have longer 
maturity. This creates the abovementioned maturity mismatch. In good 
times, such a business model works out efficiently. In bad times, however, 
this is not necessarily the case, since the fractional reserves, the fraction of 
deposits that the bank has not used to make loans and has invested in liquid 
– and therefore typically less profitable – assets, might not be enough to meet 
depositors' withdrawals. This situation in turn might deteriorate very 
quickly, leading to a phenomenon called bank run. Bank runs constitute a 
negative externality (i.e. a source of market failure) to the extent that, as they 
evolve, even solvent banks can face a heavy liquidity strain, which in turn may 
cause their insolvency.2 
Against this background, capital is the first line of defence and thus is meant 
to tackle such a risk thereby protecting the bank. In fact, a bank that is well 
capitalised is able to absorb the losses resulting from fire sales of illiquid 
assets, which are executed to meet depositors' withdrawals. By contrast, 
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when a bank is undercapitalised, it is more vulnerable to maturity mismatch. 
This is because share capital can absorb losses much more effectively than any 
other instrument. In other words, significant losses can cause a bank run, but 
if the bank in question holds a proportionally significant amount of capital, it 
can absorb the losses. If losses are expected to be effectively absorbed by 
capital, depositors should be less inclined to run on their bank to withdraw 
deposits. Therefore, given the importance of deposits to the public and the 
role of banks in maintaining financial stability, banking institutions are 
subject to minimum capital requirements.3 Accordingly, capital 
requirements are a preventive measure, which does not increase moral 
hazard. But when capital is not enough to absorb losses and a crisis 
materialises, DGSs are meant to step in and play a pivotal role. In such a 
context, DGSs' primary function is to serve as a pay-box for covered 
depositors, guaranteeing in this way the default-free character of deposits 
even in the event of a failure.4 The importance of this function rests on the 
assumption that covered depositors should have access to safe and secure 
instruments allowing them to make payments and to save.5 These 
instruments are bank deposits. However, due to the fact that banks, like any 
other firm, may be exposed to losses and potentially to insolvency, specific 
legislation on DGSs aims to render bank deposits a safe way to store money 
for payments and savings.  
DGSs usually come into play when a FOLF bank is placed under liquidation,6 
and accordingly its banking authorisation is withdrawn. In such a scenario, 
DGSs are requested to perform the pay-box function. Accordingly, they 
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assume an explicit obligation since, upon the authorisation withdrawal, they 
are required to compensate covered depositors, within a pre-specified and 
reasonably short period of time. Interestingly, the guarantee that DGSs 
provide is non-discretionary as depositors have in principle a direct claim for 
compensation against them, regardless of the conditions underlying the bank 
failure. Still, the level of protection offered is typically limited and the 
rationale for this limitation is that in this way moral hazard as well as the 
opportunity cost of building up a deposit guarantee fund that is not invested 
or used in another way can be mitigated. Furthermore, their way of working 
complies with the new approach of avoiding the use of taxpayers' money in 
the context of bank crises since they are funded exclusively by ex ante or ex 
post contributions provided by the participating banks, without any support 
from the government and/or the central bank.7 
Thus, DGSs certainly play a pivotal function in keeping financial stability in 
that they are an ex-ante form of protection for depositors, who have the 
guarantee to get their covered deposits back. Their very presence, among the 
safety-net providers, is in and of itself instrumental to keep depositors' 
confidence in the system and thereby maintain financial stability. In other 
words, the credibility that the DGS pay-box function confers to the banking 
system, by increasing trust and consequently reducing the risk of bank runs, 
is of paramount importance.8 On these grounds, banks are requested to 
become members of a DGS.9 
The pay-box function is clearly fundamental to prevent, or at least to 
mitigate, the impact of banking crises and, as such, needs to be included in 
the bank crisis management legal framework. Nevertheless, the so-called 
optional functions (i.e. the implementation of alternative measures aimed at 
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preventing a bank's failure and the provision of financial means in the context 
of liquidation aimed at preserving access of depositors to covered deposits), 
that DGSs can be empowered to perform pursuant to article 11, paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the European Union (EU) Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 
(DGSD),10 might end up being even more effective, from a system-wide 
perspective, to maintain financial stability and to reduce the destruction of 
value potentially resulting from an atomistic (or piecemeal) liquidation.11  
In this regard, the possibility for a DGS to intervene at the first signs of a 
crisis can be particularly effective in preventing the latter from escalating. In 
fact, many banking crises, still at an early stage, can be more efficiently solved 
thanks to the willingness of DGSs to financially help restructure the 
institutions concerned, avoiding in this way their failure. Likewise, the ability 
of DGSs to provide financial support in the context of a bank's liquidation 
might turn out to be particularly important for the latter to be orderly and 
effective. 
Against this background, this paper, applying a qualitative research 
methodology, but also relying on empirical data resulting from surveys, 
examines whether there are valid reasons supporting the argument that 
DGSs' optional functions might prove more effective, from a system-wide 
perspective, in maintaining financial stability and in reducing the destruction 
of value than the pay-box function. To do so, this paper analyses the EU 
legislation, focusing on the four functions that DGSs (can) perform pursuant 
to the DGSD. Thus, the pay-box function is analysed and discussed vis-à-vis 
the adoption of alternative measures aimed at preventing a bank's failure and 
the provision of financial means within a liquidation procedure aimed at 
preserving access of depositors to covered deposits. In this context, the 
arguments in favour and against the effectiveness of the latter functions are 
examined also by looking at their implementation in some EU Member 
States as well as referring to the interesting empirical results of two surveys 
recently conducted by the European Forum of Deposit Insurers (EFDI) and 
 
10 The paper will refer to the two DGSs measures regulated under article 11 
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the European Banking Authority (EBA). Accordingly, a view supporting the 
relevance of alternative measures is taken and, on these grounds, the legal 
obstacles in place at the EU level, (i.e. state aid rules and depositor preference 
rule combined with a narrow reading of the least cost principle),12 currently 
hindering the DGSs' ability to perform such functions, are explored. In this 
regard, the opposite positions of the European Commission and of the 
General Court of the European Union concerning the state aid framework 
are taken into account by analysing the Tercas case. The application of the 
least cost principle in light of the new rules extending the depositor 
preference to DGSs in the liquidation process is discussed as well. Against 
this backdrop, some reform proposals (namely a revision of the Commission's 
2013 Banking Communication as well as of the depositor preference rule and 
the least cost criterion) aimed at removing the obstacles currently in place are 
advanced with a view to enabling DGSs to implement such functions when 
this is considered to be a more effective solution to the benefit of the whole 
system, thereby paving the way for a new bank crisis management paradigm. 
Such a new bank crisis management paradigm is, in fact, the result of 
empowering DGSs both to intervene in the face of the first symptoms of a 
crisis thereby preventing it from escalating and getting out of control and to 
provide financial support in the context of a liquidation ensuring, in this way, 
that the latter is orderly and effective. 
Tackling all these issues, this paper aims at contributing to the debate on the 
role of DGSs in banking crises supporting the view that they should play a 
pivotal function since their enhanced involvement can turn out to be 
instrumental from a system-wide perspective to keep financial stability and 
to reduce the destruction of value often resulting from an atomistic 
liquidation of the assets. The paper is divided into 7 sections as follows. After 
this introduction, section 2 focuses on the EU legislation and on the 
functions that DGSs can accordingly perform. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the 
potential effectiveness of DGSs' alternative measures aimed at preventing a 
bank's failure and the potential effectiveness of DGSs' alternative measures 
in the context of liquidation, respectively. Section 5 looks at the way in which 
DGSs' optional measures have been implemented over time in some EU 
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Member States. Section 6 analyses the legal obstacles refraining DGSs from 
implementing optional interventions in banking crises, distinguishing 
between state aid rules and the depositor preference rule and, accordingly, 
advances some legislative proposals with a view to removing them. Section 7 
concludes. 
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION AND THE FUNCTIONS OF 
DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES  
Directive 94/19/EC introduced the first set of rules dealing with DGSs and it 
is, therefore, a milestone in the legislation on deposit insurance in the EU.13 
It regulated DGSs' operation on the basis of minimum harmonisation 
criteria and the principle of mutual recognition. Most notably, it made 
membership of a DGS mandatory for every bank. In fact, the participation in 
a DGS was (and still is) a prerequisite for obtaining a banking license. The 
rationale for the introduction of specific binding rules on DGS membership 
obviously was (and still is) closely connected to the important function that 
such schemes are meant to perform, along with the other safety net players, 
in ensuring confidence in the banking system. 
Nonetheless, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 prompted a lively 
debate on the need to strengthen and review the structure, financial 
resources as well as the functions of DGSs. The discussion focused in 
particular on the role of deposit insurance in the financial safety net. In 2008, 
accordingly, the European Commission formulated a proposal to promote 
convergence among Member States' DGSs, which eventually led to the 
adoption of Directive 2009/14/EC. This Directive represented the first step 
towards a structural reform of the deposit insurance system. It amended 
some shortcomings of the previous Directive with a view to achieving greater 
consistency between European DGSs.  
Additionally, at the international level, the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers (IADI) made remarkable efforts to advance innovative 
solutions in response to the global financial crisis. In 2010, IADI published 
the first version (later revised in 2014) of its Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
 
13 See Giuseppe Boccuzzi, The European Banking Union: Supervision and Resolution, 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2016), 132. 
Insurance Systems, which are the internationally recognised standards 
governing the operations of DGSs and reflect the need for effective deposit 
insurance in preserving financial stability.14 
In 2010 the European Commission proposed a recast of the Directive of 
200915 and, on 12 June 2014, the new DGSD16 was adopted as part of the new 
European regulatory and supervisory architecture. The DGSD keeps the 
legal foundations of the previous Directive in place, and the 100,000 Euro 
coverage level, already provided for by the Directive of 2009, has been 
confirmed.17 The paying-out period, by contrast, has been reduced to seven 
working days, although Member States have been given the possibility to 
phase-in this provision over a transitional period of ten years.18  
The reliability of a DGS results from its funding capability, therefore it needs 
to be able to rely on adequate financial resources for its interventions. The 
DGSD introduced a more structured funding system, trying to fix the 
shortcomings of the previous Directive which had let Member States decide 
whether their DGSs were to be financed ex-ante or ex-post.19 The new 
provisions on funding create a model based on both ex-ante and ex-post 
contributions, through a four-step approach.20 The first step consists of a 
solid ex-ante fund, set up through the banks' ordinary contributions.21 The 
 
14 See International Association of Deposit Insurers, 'Core Principles for Effective 
Deposit Insurance Systems' (2014) <https://www.iadi.org/en/assets/File/ 
Core%20Principles/cprevised2014nov.pdf> accessed 30 August 2020. 
15 On the need to further amend the legislation in place back then see Rym Ayadi and 
Rosa Lastra, 'Proposals for Reforming Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Europe' 
(2010) 11 Journal of Banking Regulation 219. 
16 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
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17 Article 6 of DGSD.  
18 Article 8 of DGSD. 
19 See Giuseppe Boccuzzi and Riccardo De Lisa, The Changing Face of Deposit 
Insurance in Europe: from the DGSD to the EDIS Proposal, in Giampio Bracchi, 
Umberto Filotto and Donato Masciandaro (eds), The Italian banks: which will be the 
"new normal"? (Edibank 2016), 6. 
20 Article 10 of DGSD. 
21 On this, see European Banking Authority, 'Guidelines on Methods for Calculating 
Contributions to Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs)' (2015) 
 
target level of the ex-ante fund is at least 0.8% of covered deposits and such a 
target level is to be reached by 3 July 2024; 30% of the ex-ante fund, in turn, 
can be made up of payment commitments, which have to be fully 
collateralized.22 In addition to the ex-ante fund, the Directive also introduced 
extraordinary ex post contributions, which banks are required to provide in 
the event of a pay-out and when the available financial resources are not 
sufficient to reimburse depositors. These contributions shall not exceed 
0.5% of covered deposits per year.23 The third form of financing is the 
alternative funding arrangements. These arrangements are meant to enable 
DGSs to get short-term funding from the markets, should they need it. 
Eventually, if all these resources prove insufficient, DGSs may also rely on a 
mutual voluntary borrowing facility. Accordingly, it is stated that DGSs can 
borrow funds from other EU DGSs under certain conditions and up to 0.5% 
of their covered deposits. 
In relation to their operation, the DGSD confers upon DGSs four functions. 
Two of these functions are mandatory, whereas the remaining two are 
optional as Member States can decide whether they want their DGSs to also 
perform them in addition to the mandatory ones.24 These functions are: 1) the 
pay-box function, to be performed in the context of liquidation, which is 
mandatory; 2) resolution financing, which is mandatory as well; 3) the 
implementation of alternative measures aimed at preventing a bank's failure, 
which is optional; and 4) the provision of financial means in the context of 
liquidation aimed at preserving access of depositors to covered deposits, 
which is optional as well. 
The pay-box function is exercised in the context of a winding up and aims to 
protect the covered depositors of a failing bank. It is considered the core 





20DGS.pdf> accessed 30 August 2020. 
22 Article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3 of DGSD.  
23 Article 10, paragraph 8 of DGSD. 
24 Article 11 of DGSD. 
25 Pursuant to article 11 paragraph 1 of the DGSD, the financial means of a DGS shall 
be primarily used in order to repay depositors pursuant to this Directive. 
entitled to subrogate to the covered depositors' rights in the assets' 
liquidation process, benefiting now from the same preference given to 
covered depositors by article 108 of the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD).26 The granting to DGSs of the same superpriority given 
to covered depositors in the liquidation ranking makes it more likely for them 
to recover a substantial part (or possibly all) of the amount used to reimburse 
the depositors. Nevertheless, this could, in turn, affect the DGS's ability to 
perform the other functions as further discussed in section VI.2. 
The DGS is also meant to finance the resolution of a bank that is FOLF. Such 
a function is to be carried out according to the conditions laid out in article 
109 of the BRRD and makes DGSs act as loss absorbers to the benefit of 
covered depositors.27 Thus, the DGS will contribute to the resolution 
financing to the extent that it would have suffered a loss by reimbursing 
covered depositors in the hypothetical event of such bank being submitted 
to ordinary insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, should bail-in be applied, 
the DGS would be required to provide the bank under resolution with 
resources equivalent to the amount by which covered deposits would have 
been written down in the hypothetical scenario of them being bailed-in (so-
called virtual bail-in). Similarly, should the other resolution tools be 
implemented, the DGS would be requested to contribute an amount 
equivalent to the losses that such covered depositors would have suffered. 
 
26 Pursuant to article 108 paragraph 1 of the BRRD, 'Member States shall ensure that 
in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings: (a) the following 
have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for the 
claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (i) that part of eligible deposits from natural 
persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the 
coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU; (ii) deposits that 
would be eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of 
institutions established within the Union; (b) the following have the same priority 
ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for under point (a): (i) covered 
deposits; (ii) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations 
of covered depositors in insolvency'. 
27 Pursuant to article 11 paragraph 2 of the DGSD the financial means of a DGS shall 
be used in order to finance the resolution of credit institutions in accordance with 
Article 109 of the BRRD. The resolution authority shall determine, after 
consulting the DGS, the amount by which the DGS is liable. 
Yet, performing this function is now made more unlikely due to the 
introduction of depositor preference pursuant to article 108 of the BRRD, 
determining that the DGS should make a contribution only when all the 
other liabilities ranked below covered deposits are not enough to absorb the 
incurred losses.28 
Beside these two mandatory functions, Member States can decide, pursuant 
to article 11, paragraph 3 of the DGSD, to also permit their DGSs to intervene 
at an early stage to prevent a bank's crisis by providing different forms of 
support.29 Nevertheless, such interventions need to meet some criteria in 
order to be carried out.30 The most relevant condition is that these measures 
must comply with the 'least cost principle', under which they cannot end up 
being more costly for the DGS than the amount it would have paid to 
reimburse covered depositors had the bank undergone a piecemeal 
liquidation.31 The second optional function that a DGS can perform 
according to article 11, paragraph 6 of the DGSD is the provision of financial 
 
28 See Simon Gleeson and Randall Guynn, Bank Resolution and Crisis Management. Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2016) 173. 
29 The paper will refer to the measures regulated under article 11 paragraph 3 of the 
DGSD as preventive function(s), preventive measure(s), or preventive 
intervention(s) interchangeably. 
30 Pursuant to article 11 paragraph 3 of the DGSD, the following conditions need to 
be met: '(a) the resolution authority has not taken any resolution action under 
article 32 of BRRD; (b) the DGS has appropriate systems and procedures in place 
for selecting and implementing alternative measures and monitoring affiliated 
risks; (c) the costs of the measures do not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory 
or contractual mandate of the DGS; (d) the use of alternative measures by the DGS 
is linked to conditions imposed on the credit institution that is being supported, 
involving at least more stringent risk monitoring and greater verification rights for 
the DGS; (e) the use of alternative measures by the DGS is linked to commitments 
by the credit institution being supported with a view to securing access to covered 
deposits; (f) the ability of the affiliated credit institutions to pay the extraordinary 
contributions in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article is confirmed in the 
assessment of the competent authority'. 
31 These measures are contemplated also by principle 15 of the IADI Principles for 
Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, stating that '[t]he deposit insurer should be 
part of a framework within the financial system safety net that provides for the 
early detection and timely intervention and resolution of troubled banks'; see 
International Association of Deposit Insurers (n 14) 21. 
support in the context of a winding up.32 Such an intervention is to be carried 
out with the objective of preserving access of depositors to their covered 
deposits.33 Nevertheless, even these interventions, like the preventive 
interventions, must comply with the 'least cost principle'.34 
The following part of this paper will focus on these two optional functions, 
starting with a discussion of the arguments supporting that their 
implementation might prove more efficient than depositors' pay-out, from a 
system-wide perspective, in maintaining financial stability and in reducing 
the destruction of value potentially resulting from an atomistic liquidation. 
The paper will refer to the two DGSs measures regulated under article 11, 
paragraphs 3 and 6 of the DGSD as optional or alternative measure(s), 
optional or alternative intervention(s) or optional or alternative function(s), 
interchangeably. 
III. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
AIMED AT PREVENTING A BANK'S FAILURE 
The intervention of a DGS at the first symptoms of a bank's crisis can be 
particularly effective in preventing the latter from escalating and getting out 
of control. In fact, many banking crises, still at an early stage, can be more 
 
32 The paper will refer to the measures regulated under article 11 paragraph 6 of the 
DGSD as alternative function(s) in the context of liquidation, alternative 
measure(s) in the context of liquidation or alternative intervention(s) in the context 
of liquidation, interchangeably. 
33 Pursuant to article 11 paragraph 6 of the DGSD, Member States may decide that 
the available financial means may also be used to finance measures to preserve the 
access of depositors to covered deposits, including transfer of assets and liabilities 
and deposit book transfer, in the context of national insolvency proceedings, 
provided that the costs borne by the DGS do not exceed the net amount of 
compensating covered depositors at the credit institution concerned. 
34 These measures are contemplated also by principle 16 of the IADI Principles for 
Effective Deposit Insurance Systems, stating that '…In addition, the deposit 
insurer or other relevant financial system safety-net participant should have the 
authority to establish a flexible mechanism to help preserve critical banking 
functions by facilitating the acquisition by an appropriate body of the assets and 
the assumption of the liabilities of a failed bank (e.g. providing depositors with 
continuous access to their funds and maintaining clearing and settlement 
activities)'; see International Association of Deposit Insurers (n 14) 22. 
efficiently solved thanks to the ability of DGSs to help restructure the 
institutions concerned. Such a preventive intervention, in addition, can be 
seen as beneficial for the whole system that otherwise could be negatively 
affected both in reputational and economic terms. Indeed, in the context of 
bank crises, there is always a special public interest to safeguard depositors 
and, linked to it, to protect the stability of the system. In some cases, this goal 
can be more successfully achieved through preventive action. 
Of course, DGSs are expected to conduct a cost-benefit analysis before 
performing preventive interventions. The benchmark to consider in 
conducting such an assessment is the hypothetical cost that they should pay 
to reimburse covered depositors in the event that the bank in crisis ended up 
being liquidated without the deposits being transferred to another bank. If 
such assessment shows that the cost of depositors' pay-out is higher than the 
cost of restructuring, then the preventive intervention should take place. 
Obviously, the cost of depositors pay-out is to be calculated also in light of 
the amount that the DGS expects to recover from the insolvency proceeding 
after subrogating to the depositors' rights, although, from this perspective, 
the extension of depositors super priority to DGSs represents a possible 
obstacle, as discussed in section VI.2.  
Yet, experience has shown that preventive measures are generally less costly 
than the reimbursement of depositors.35 Nevertheless, there might also be 
cases where a bank collects only a limited amount of covered deposits, but at 
the same time performs crucial functions for its group. The failure of such a 
bank could have terrible effects on the other group members and possibly on 
financial stability. In such a case, however, the cost of preventive measures 
might exceed the cost of pay-out of covered depositors, thereby preventing 
their application.36 
On these grounds, DGSs can be seen as reactive system-wide tools, funded 
directly by banks, to be employed at the early stages of a crisis, on the 
assumption that it is in the interest of the whole banking system to prevent 
 
35 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers, 'EFDI State of Play and Non-Binding 
Guidance Paper. Guarantee Schemes' Alternative Measures to Pay-out for 
Effective Banking Crisis Solution' (2019) 29. 
36 Ibid. 
(or at least mitigate) its negative effects. Accordingly, their task should be to 
play a central role in preventing banking crises by disbursing, at an early stage, 
the resources provided by other banks.  
IV. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES IN 
THE CONTEXT OF LIQUIDATION  
The ability of DGSs to provide financial support in the context of a bank's 
winding up is particularly important for the latter to be orderly, as requested 
by the BRRD, and effective. According to article 32(b) of the BRRD, indeed, 
Member States shall ensure that a FOLF institution in relation to which the 
resolution authority considers that all the conditions for resolution are met, 
except for the resolution action being in the public interest,37 shall be wound 
up in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.38 
The final objectives of the winding up procedure are the liquidation of the 
assets and the payment of creditors, which are to be carried out by the 
liquidators. This means that the creditors' interest to be repaid should drive 
the action of both the authorities and the liquidators. Nevertheless, a number 
of other extremely relevant interests should be taken into due consideration 
in running the procedure in order for it to be orderly and effective. Chief 
among them are the stability of the system, the confidence of depositors and 
investors and the safeguarding of the going concern value of the FOLF bank.  
To this end, normal corporate insolvency proceedings, (typically run by law 
courts), which apply to non-financial firms, are often not considered 
adequate for banks.39 This results from the fact that these proceedings are 
 
37 On public interest, see Marco Bodellini, 'Impediments to Resolvability: Critical 
Issues and Challenges Ahead' (2019) 5 Open Review of Management, Banking and 
Finance 52. 
38 Article 32(b) has been introduced within the BRRD by Directive (EU) 2019/879 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019, amending Directive 
2014/59/EU as regards the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit 
institutions and investment firms and Directive 98/26/EC, OJ L 150/296 (so-called 
BRRD 2). 
39 See Thomas F. Huertas, 'The Case for Bail-ins' in Andreas Dombret and Patrick S. 
Kenadjian (eds), The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. Europe's Solution for 'Too 
 
usually lengthy and slow and primarily aimed at (simply) liquidating the assets. 
The proceeds arising from the sale of the assets are then used to pay (typically, 
only some of) the creditors.40 As a consequence, the continuation of the 
FOLF bank's activities would not be guaranteed, possibly provoking 
destruction of value.41 The interruption of the activities in turn can have a 
potential destabilising impact on the bank's counterparties and, more 
broadly, on the banking and financial system as well as, sometimes, on its 
geographical area of operation.  
Accordingly, even though the final objective of the winding up procedure is 
the assets' liquidation and the payment of the bank's creditors, still atomistic 
liquidation is seldom considered an effective and efficient crisis management 
procedure for FOLF banks, mostly because it does not ensure the 
continuation of critical functions, thereby potentially affecting the bank's 
counterparties. This in turn might end up destroying the going concern value 
of the good parts of the bank in crisis and therefore can be detrimental for 
both the bank's creditors and the system as a whole.  
To avoid these negative outcomes, the liquidation procedure should then 
take forms resembling – to a certain extent – the resolution procedure. This 
can be achieved through the use of legal instruments similar to the resolution 
tools now regulated by the BRRD. Thus, the main tool to use in the winding 
up procedure with a view to continuing (at least some of) the FOLF bank's 
critical functions would be an instrument similar to the sale of business tool, 
 
Big to Fail'? (De Gruyter 2013) 167-168; Randall Guynn, 'Are Bailouts Inevitable?' 
(2012) 29 Yale Journal on Regulation 121, 137-140; Wolf-Georg Ringe, 'Bail-in 
between Liquidity and Solvency', (2006) University of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series No. 33/2006, 6, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782457> accessed 30 
August 2020. 
40 Marco Bodellini, 'Greek and Italian "Lessons" on Bank Restructuring: Is 
Precautionary Recapitalization the Way Forward?' (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 145. 
41 See Rosa Lastra, Costanza Russo and Marco Bodellini, 'Stock Take of the SRB's 
Activities over the Past Years: What to Improve and Focus on?' (2019) Study 
Requested by the ECOM Committee of the European Parliament, 11, 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634392/IPOL_ST
U(2019)634392_EN.pdf> accessed 30 August 2020. 
which I define as 'sale of business-like tool'.42 The latter would allow to 
transfer both assets and liabilities of the bank under liquidation to another 
bank at market prices (which are expected to be higher than liquidation 
prices), thereby allowing for the continuation of (at least some of) the 
activities of the FOLF bank through the purchasing institution and 
safeguarding in this way the going concern value of the FOLF entity.  
In this way, the winding up could become a means to allow for the 
continuation of (some of) the failing bank's activities through a different 
bank, thereby merging together the dissolving function of the liquidation 
procedure with the business continuity character of the sale of business tool. 
The outcomes which could be achieved through the application of the 'sale 
of business-like tool' in a winding up procedure would be the following: 1) 
deposits could be moved to the purchasing bank and depositors, therefore, 
would be fully protected, thereby avoiding runs on other banks and possibly 
systemic risk; 2) borrowers would keep on accessing financial means provided 
by the purchasing bank, avoiding to negatively affect the real economy; 3) 
assets and liabilities (or at least some of them) would be transferred to the 
purchasing bank, thereby allowing for the continuation of the business 
activity and maintaining the going concern value. 
Yet, even if liquidators manage to find another institution willing to purchase 
all (or a part of) the assets and liabilities of the bank under liquidation, the 
value of the liabilities to transfer to the purchasing bank would still, fairly 
obviously, exceed the value of the assets. In such a scenario, DGSs can play a 
pivotal role to successfully help run the liquidation procedure. Indeed, they 
might provide funds to be used to compensate the purchasing bank for taking 
on such a negative balance between assets and liabilities. Nonetheless, such 
an intervention is to take place only if the amount of resources to provide is 
 
42 Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1, number 58 of the BRRD, the sale of business tool 
is 'the mechanism for effecting a transfer by a resolution authority of shares or 
other instruments of ownership issued by an institution under resolution, or assets, 
rights or liabilities, of an institution under resolution to a purchaser that is not a 
bridge institution …'. According to article 38 paragraph 1 of the BRRD, 'Member 
States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to transfer to a 
purchaser that is not a bridge institution … (b) all or any assets, rights or liabilities 
of an institution under resolution'. 
estimated to be lesser than the amount that the DGS should pay to covered 
depositors in the event of an atomistic liquidation without the transfer of 
deposits to another bank. In this regard, EFDI has taken the view that the 
least cost evaluation should  
consider a comprehensive range of elements, including the direct (financial, 
operational, etc.) and indirect costs (missing return on liquidity, increasing 
cost of funding, etc.) of pay-out, adequate haircuts on the expected recovery 
side, and also contagion and reputation risks which may lead to further 
reimbursements; on the other side, the costs of 'interventions in liquidation' 
for the DGS, entailing refundable or recoverable disbursements and 
guarantees, are proposed to be calculated to the extent of expected losses 
estimated at the date of the intervention.43 
Against this background, the application of the 'sale of business-like tool' 
during the winding up procedure can be seen as an alternative to the bank's 
atomistic liquidation. The choice between these two alternatives (i.e. 
atomistic liquidation vis-à-vis application of the 'sale of business-like tool') 
should be based on a comparative assessment. Accordingly, the authorities 
should run a counterfactual scenario on the basis of which the liquidation 
strategy is to be informed. 
In developing this counterfactual scenario, it should be assumed that in the 
event of a piecemeal liquidation: 1) the assets will be sold at discounted prices 
over a relatively long period of time; 2) the bank's activities will be 
immediately interrupted; 3) the pledged performing assets will be seized and 
enforced by the secured creditors; 4) the DGS will have to step in to protect 
covered depositors; 5) the contractual relationships will be immediately 
terminated with liquidators calling back all the loans and credit lines 
previously extended to the bank's borrowers. 
In practical terms, this would cause enterprises and households to be obliged 
to pay back their loans to the liquidators overnight. This, in turn, could create 
a domino effect triggering a significant number of failures affecting many 
more counterparties. Uninsured depositors and unsecured creditors would 
have to wait for the winding up procedure timeframe to try and get (likely, 
only a part of) their money back. The DGS should immediately reimburse the 
covered depositors and after that it could exercise the subrogation right to 
 
43 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 6. 
the depositors' rights in the liquidation procedure. Nevertheless, due to the 
limited amount of immediately available resources, in some cases, the DGS 
will likely have to ask its member banks for extra contributions. Also, the 
guarantees released by guarantors, if any, would be immediately enforced. As 
a consequence, the guarantors would have to pay immediately the guarantee-
holders before being able to exercise the ensuing subrogation right in the 
liquidation procedure. 
For all these reasons the application of the 'sale of business-like tool' is often 
to be considered more efficient than a piecemeal liquidation, since it is able 
to allow, on the one hand, for the continuation of the bank's most critical 
functions and, on the other hand, for the protection of the FOLF bank's 
going concern value. Consequently, the atomistic liquidation with the DGS 
reimbursement of covered depositors should be activated only in cases in 
which the sudden interruption of the bank's activities and the destruction of 
the going concern value are not considered able to negatively affect the 
system. Still, for the 'sale of business-like tool' to be successfully employed in 
the context of a bank's liquidation, the DGS needs to be involved in order to 
finance the transaction(s). 
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES' 
OPTIONAL MEASURES IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES 
The implementation of DGSs' optional measures has been common practice 
in several EU Member States, thereby showing that there is consensus (at 
least in some countries) on their effectiveness. According to a survey recently 
conducted by EFDI on its members, 14 DGSs (of which 8 are private and 6 
public) are empowered to implement preventive measures pursuant to article 
11, paragraph 3 of the DGSD.44 The EBA recently conducted a similar survey 
according to which 'fourteen respondents from fourteen Member States 
reported that the use of measures under Article 11(3) was allowed in their 
 
44 Ibid 15, pointing out that within the European Union such interventions can be 
performed in Austria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta 
and Spain. 
jurisdiction'.45 With regard to the measures under article 11, paragraph 6 of 
DGSD, the EFDI survey pointed out that 17 DGSs (of which 6 are private 
and 11 public), according to their statute, can carry out alternative 
interventions in the context of liquidation as well.46 Both preventive 
measures and optional measures in the context of liquidation have been 
frequently employed by several DGSs in some EU Member States and, over 
time, have proven to be effective.47 
According to the EFDI's survey, the most common preventive measures 
adopted by DGSs pursuant to article 11, paragraph 3 of the DGSD were: 1) 
guarantees provided by the DGS on equity instruments issued for the 
purpose of bank recovery; 2) subscription by the DGS of equity instruments 
issued for the purpose of bank recovery; 3) acquisition by the DGS of non-
performing loans of the distressed bank; 4) direct financing by the DGS; 5) 
guarantees provided by the DGS on loans granted by third parties; 6) 
guarantees provided by the DGS in the context of asset protection schemes; 
7) interest rate allowance (e.g. on loans received by the distressed bank); 8) 
other forms of contribution (e.g. consultancy costs and management tutoring 
cost, reduction by incentives to retirements, personnel training, IT upgrade 
costs).48 
 
45 See European Banking Authority, 'Opinion of the European Banking Authority on 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Funding and Uses of Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Funds' (2020), 76, EBA/OP/2020/02 <https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/ 
documents/files/document_library/Publications/Opinions/2020/EBA%20Opinio
n%20on%20DGS%20funding%20and%20uses%20of%20DGS%20funds.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2020. 
46 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 15, pointing out that within the 
European Union such interventions can be performed in Austria, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia and United Kingdom (which at that time was still an EU 
Member State). 
47 Ibid 16-19, pointing out that before the approval of the DGSD in 2014, 14 DGSs 
had implemented preventive measures. 8 of these DGSs were private and 6 were 
public schemes; similarly 7 DGSs had implemented alternative measures in the 
context of liquidation as well. 3 of these DGSs were private and 4 were public 
schemes. 
48 Ibid 18. 
Likewise, the most common alternative measures in the context of 
liquidation adopted by DGSs pursuant to article 11, paragraph 6 of the DGSD 
were: 1) full transfer of assets, liabilities and other contracts of the bank under 
liquidation to another bank; 2) partial transfer of assets and liabilities; 3) 
imbalance and liquidation costs to be covered; 4) guarantees provided by the 
DGS on equity instruments issued by the purchasing bank; 5) subscription by 
the DGS of equity instruments issued by the purchasing bank; 6) acquisition 
by the DGS of non-performing loans of the bank under liquidation; 7) 
guarantees provided by the DGS on assets transferred to the purchasing 
bank; 8) allowances to the acquiring bank.49  
Italy, for example, has for a long time had in place rules allowing its domestic 
DGSs to perform both optional functions.50 Interestingly, these optional 
measures were carried out much more often than the mandatory pay-box 
function because they were considered more effective than the latter.51In 
practice, instead of paying out the amount of covered deposits in the event of 
a piecemeal liquidation, the Italian DGSs used: 1) to finance in several ways 
their member in trouble, typically in the context of early intervention 
measures, to prevent the situation from escalating and becoming an 
irreversible crisis, typically a) by financing the acquisition of the troubled 
bank by another bank; b) by recapitalising it; c) by providing guarantees; d) by 
purchasing shares; e) by taking on the mismatch between liabilities and assets 
to be transferred; and 2) to provide different forms of financial support in the 
context of liquidation with the goal of preserving access of depositors to their 
 
49 Ibid 21. 
50 See Giuseppe Boccuzzi (n 1) 234. 
51 Similarly, see Augustìn Carstens, 'Deposit Insurance and Financial Stability: Old 
and New Challenges' (2018) Keynote Address at the 17th IADI Annual General 
Meeting and Annual Conference on Deposit Insurance and Financial Stability: 
Recent Financial Topics, Basel 18 October 2018, 3, 
<https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp181024a.pdf> accessed 30 August 2020, arguing 
that the deposit insurer may require a wider range of instruments, beyond 
conventional liquidation actions which are 'needed to protect deposits as well as to 
manage and sell the bank's assets in a way that minimises the cost to the deposit 
insurance funds and maximises value for creditors'; for an overview of liquidation 
cases with DGS pay-outs across the EU, see Dalvinder Singh, European Cross-Border 
Banking and Banking Supervision (Oxford University Press 2020), appendix 6, table 
6.2. 
covered deposits, typically a) by financing the acquisition of the troubled 
bank by another bank or b) by taking on the mismatch between liabilities and 
assets to be transferred. The Italian DGSs informed their decisions through 
a preventive assessment of both the potential success of the intervention and 
its cost vis-à-vis the amount they should have paid to covered depositors had 
the bank been submitted to a piecemeal liquidation ('least cost principle'). 
From 1988 to 2018, the main Italian DGS (Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei 
Depositi) intervened twelve times: in eight cases, the intervention was 
conducted to allow for the transfer of assets and liabilities to another bank in 
the context of a liquidation, thereby avoiding an inefficient piecemeal 
liquidation. In two cases, the intervention supported banks at the early stage 
of a crisis and only in two cases the DGS simply reimbursed covered 
depositors in the context of a piecemeal liquidation.52 In the last two years 
the Italian DGS intervened two more times by subscribing to very large 
increases of capital to the benefit of Cassa di Risparmio di Genova and Banca 
Popolare di Bari, both placed under temporary administration.53 In line with 
 
52 See Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi, 'FIDT's Interventions, 
Interventions Report' (2020) <https://www.fitd.it/Cosa_Facciamo/Interventi> 
accessed 30 August 2020, according to which the total amount disbursed over time 
by the Italian DGS was EUR 1,249.30 million, of which only EUR 77.3 million for 
depositors pay-out.  
53 See Ilsole24ore, 'Carige, Firmato l'Accordo per la Soluzione Privata di Salvataggio', 
Ilsole24.com (10 August 2019) <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/carige-firmato-l-
accordo-la-soluzione-privata-salvataggio-ACbF7Be> accessed 30 August 2020; 
Giuseppe Fonte, 'Italy in Talks with EU over Popolare Bari Rescue', Reuters (9 
January 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-banks-popolare-di-bari-
idUSKBN1Z813J> accessed 30 August 2020; see also Francesco Capriglione, 
'Banking Crises and Systemic Crises. The Italian Case' (2019) 8 Law and Economics 
Yearly Review passim; Cristina Dias, Jérôme Deslandes and Marcel Magnus, 
'Recent Measures for Banca Carige from a BRRD and State Aid Perspective' (2019) 
European Parliament Briefing, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
etudes/BRIE/2019/624413/IPOL_BRI(2019)624413_EN.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2020, underlining that the funds provided by the Italian DGS in the 
recapitalization of Carige amounted to EUR 238.8 million in addition to another 
EUR 313.2 million previously provided by its voluntary arm. The funds provided by 
the Italian DGS in the recapitalization of Banca Banca Popolare di Bari amounted 
to EUR 310 million with the DGS commitment to further inject EUR 390 million, 
if needed. 
such an approach, between 1997 and 2015 the mutual bank's DGS (Fondo di 
Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo) intervened eighty times and 
only in one case it reimbursed covered depositors within an atomistic 
liquidation procedure.54 
That is why the role of DGSs should not be limited to just performing the 
pay-box function and the implementation of the optional functions should, 
therefore, not be hindered, but rather facilitated. In this vein, each Member 
State should be encouraged (indeed required) to transpose into its domestic 
framework the provisions under article 11, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the DGSD 
in order for DGSs to be empowered to carry out such functions at the early 
intervention stage as well as at the liquidation stage, thereby paving the way 
for a new bank crisis management paradigm. 
VI. THE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
OPTIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN BANKING CRISES AND SOME 
PROPOSALS TO REMOVE THEM 
Despite the benefits of having DGSs that are empowered to perform 
optional functions, there are a number of legal constraints at the EU level 
affecting their capability to implement such measures. A combination of 
different rules with a different rationale can, indeed, make DGSs' optional 
interventions very difficult to be put in place. These provisions are: 1) state 
aid rules, particularly the 2013 European Commission Banking 
Communication, paragraph 63; 2) depositor preference pursuant to article 
108 of the BRRD, which applies also to DGSs when subrogating to 
depositors' rights in insolvency proceedings, combined with a narrow reading 
of the 'least cost principle'.   
 
54 See Francesco Baldi, Marcello Bredice and Roberto Di Salvo, 'Bank-Crisis 
Management Practises in Italy (1978-2015). Perspectives on the Italian Cooperative 
Credit Network' (2015) 2 The Journal of European Economic History 144-145, 
recalling that the total amount disbursed over time by the Italian Mutual Banks' 
DGS was EUR 1,363 million. 
1. The Obstacles Resulting from the State Aid Framework 
The first issue arises from paragraph 63 of the 2013 European Commission 
Banking Communication, which states that when a DGS provides funds with 
a view to helping restructure a bank in crisis, for the intervention to comply 
with the state aid rules, regardless of the private nature of the resources, such 
resources must not be under the state's control and the decision to intervene 
must not be imputable to the state.55 When this is not the case, the 
intervention will be considered a provision of state aid measures and will need 
to be authorised by the Commission.56 In order to be authorised by the 
Commission, burden sharing measures typically have to be implemented as 
well. This, in turn, can create further issues since the DGS as such does not 
have any power to apply the burden-sharing mechanism.57 Additionally, there 
are cases where the application of burden sharing measures might end up 
being counterproductive since they could give rise to knock-on effects.58 
This provision is particularly critical also in light of the fact that a bank 
receiving assistance, which is qualified as extraordinary public financial 
support, would be consequently considered as FOLF under article 32 of the 
BRRD. As a consequence, the determination of the bank being FOLF would 
compromise the DGS's attempt to avoid its failure through the preventive 
 
55 2013 European Commission Banking Communication, paragraph 63 reads as 
follows: 'Interventions by deposit guarantee funds to reimburse depositors in 
accordance with Member States' obligations under Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-
guarantee schemes … do not constitute State aid ... However, the use of those or 
similar funds to assist in the restructuring of credit institutions may constitute 
State aid. Whilst the funds in question may derive from the private sector, they may 
constitute aid to the extent that they come within the control of the State and the 
decision as to the funds' application is imputable to the State ... The Commission 
will assess the compatibility of State aid in the form of such interventions under 
this Communication'. 
56 Interestingly, pursuant to the 2013 Banking Communication, paragraph 63, on the 
contrary, performing the pay-box function does not qualify as a provision of state 
aid measures. 
57 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 5. 
58 This is why paragraph 45 of the 2013 Banking Communication empowers the 
Commission to exclude the application of the burden sharing mechanism when 
this would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results. 
intervention.59 Against this background, the EBA has stated that 'there may 
be merit in clarifying in the EU framework that the use of DGS funds for 
failure prevention would not in itself trigger the determination that the 
institution was failing or likely to fail'.60 
The European Commission had the opportunity to apply the 2013 Banking 
Communication rules on DGSs in the Tercas case in which it took the view 
that the measures implemented by the Italian DGS to rescue that institution 
qualified as a state aid pursuant to article 107 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This interpretation was 
eventually confirmed on 23 December 2015 on the basis of: 1) the alleged 
public nature of the resources owned by the scheme; 2) the public mandate 
exercised by the Italian DGS in the operation; and 3) the role played by the 
Bank of Italy in the approval of the intervention.61 
Nevertheless, Italy, Banca Popolare di Bari and the Italian DGS, with the 
intervention of Bank of Italy, challenged the European Commission's 
decision, bringing a legal claim before the General Court of the European 
Union for its annulment. The claim was based on the alleged infringement of 
article 107 TFEU for erroneous reconstruction of the facts concerning: 1) the 
public nature of the resources; 2) the imputability to the State of the 
contested measures; 3) the granting of a selective advantage and 4) the 
 
59 See Concetta Brescia Morra 'The New European Union Framework for Banking 
Crisis Management: Rules versus Discretion' (2019) 3 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 365. 
60 See European Banking Authority (n 45), 80, also suggesting that '[t]he wording of 
Article 11 of the DGSD should be clarified to ensure that measures mentioned in 
Article 11(3) are referred to as "preventive measures" and those in Article 11(6) are 
referred to as "alternative measures", because currently the measure under Article 
11(3) is referred to as an "alternative measure", which could create confusion about 
the purpose of such measures'. 
61 European Commission, 'Decision on the State Aid' SA.39451 (2015/C) (ex 
2015/NN) implemented by Italy for Banca Tercas, Brussels, C (2015) 9526, 23 
December 2015. 
assessment of the compatibility of the alleged state aid with the internal 
market.62 
On 19 March 2019, the General Court of the European Union issued the 
judgment in Joined Cases T-98/16, T-196/16 and T-198/16 and annulled the 
Commission's decision.63 The Court argued that the Italian DGS was not 
carrying out any public mandate, since these optional measures, which are 
never mandatory, were adopted by the DGS only in order to avoid the more 
costly financial consequences of reimbursing covered depositors.64 This 
would have occurred in the event of a piecemeal liquidation. This argument 
was further supported by the fact that the DGS intervened on the premise 
that its measures were compliant with the least cost principle.65  
The Court highlighted that the Italian DGS is a private consortium of banks, 
which acts on behalf and in the interest of its members (i.e. the Italian banks) 
and its bodies are composed of the banks' representatives who are appointed 
by the DGS's members themselves.66 Similarly, the Court rejected the 
argument that the Bank of Italy could exercise control over the DGS 
activities by attending its meetings through one of its officials as an observer 
with no voting rights.67  
The Court also reached the conclusion that the DGS's intervention was the 
result of the free will of its members, autonomously deciding: 1) to make the 
DGS carry out those preventive measures and 2) to finance the support 
granted to Tercas, pursuing their own private interest of avoiding the more 
expensive reimbursement of covered depositors, which would have been 
carried out in the event of a piecemeal liquidation.68 In the Court's view, the 
 
62 See Andrea Vignini, 'State Aid and Deposit Guarantee Schemes. The CJEU 
Decision on Tercas and the Role of DGSs in Banking Crises' in The Role of the CJEU 
in Shaping the Banking Union: Notes on Tercas (T-98/16) and Fininvest (Quaderni di 
Ricerca Giuridica della Consulenza Legale della Banca d'Italia 2019) 21. 
63 Joined Cases T-98/16, T-196/16 and T-198/16 Italian Republic and Others v European 
Commission EU: T:2019:167. 
64 Ibid paragraph 97. 
65 Ibid paragraph 104.  
66 Ibid paragraph 113. 
67 Ibid paragraph 121. 
68 Ibid paragraph 159. 
Commission failed to prove sufficiently that the resources were under the 
control and at disposal of the Italian public authorities.69 All these elements 
and considerations, accordingly, drove the Court to annul the Commission's 
decision on the grounds that the intervention concerned did not violate the 
state aid framework. Nonetheless, the European Commission appealed 
against the judgment of the General Court before the Court of Justice and 
the case is still pending.70 
The decision of the General Court shed some light on the interplay between 
state aid rules and DGSs' optional interventions, thereby opening up the 
possibility of putting these DGSs alternative interventions in place where the 
conditions highlighted in the judgement are met. However, DGSs with a 
decision-making process based on the involvement of public authorities 
might be barred from implementing those measures since they could be 
qualified as state aid. This interpretation could be grounded on the 
assumption of their decisions being considered imputable to their state and 
their resources being regarded as under their state's control.71 But if this will 
be the case, such a reading of the Banking Communication rules, in turn, 
could affect the level playing field between DGSs (and, as a consequence, 
between their domestic banking systems) established in different Member 
States on the basis of their governance arrangements, threatening in this way 
competition in the EU single market. Indeed, in this case the intervention of 
a public DGS would be qualified as state aid and therefore it could be 
implemented only after being authorised by the European Commission. The 
latter is empowered to authorise similar interventions when burden-sharing 
 
69 Ibid paragraph 161.  
70 Case C-425/19 P <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text= 
&docid=216205&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=8873673> accessed 23 February 2021; the appeal states: 'The Commission 
considers that the judgment under appeal is based on incorrect legal considerations 
and distortion of the facts, which irremediably invalidate its findings and the 
operative part of the judgment'. 
71 The European Forum of Deposit Insurers, for example, distinguishes among its 
members between publicly managed DGSs and privately managed DGSs on the 
basis of a self-assessment that the members conducted by focusing on corporate 
status (in the national jurisdiction) and/or corporate governance mechanism 
(appointment of directors, decision-making powers); see European Forum of 
Deposit Insurers (n 35), 15. 
measures involving shareholders and subordinated creditors are put in place 
as well. The application of burden-sharing measures, however, might be 
sometimes detrimental, thus in such cases it should not take place.72 
Additionally, the application of the burden sharing mechanism to equity 
instruments and subordinated debt instruments falls outside the DGS 
mandate and therefore requires a specific decision of the resolution 
authorities. In this regard, it has been observed that the inability of DGSs to 
implement burden-sharing measures 'reflects an asymmetry with the 
resolution authorities’ powers', thereby creating coordination issues.73 
The Tercas case is rather informative in this regard, since it clearly shows how 
the European Commission reads and interprets its 2013 Banking 
Communication rules. The European Commission decided that a private law 
consortium that is privately funded and managed, like the Italian DGS, 
granted state aid measures to Tercas because its intervention was influenced 
and directed by the Italian public authorities (mostly the Bank of Italy). This 
reading of the facts has been criticised74 and eventually the Commission's 
decision was overruled by the General Court of the European Union.75 The 
decision of the General Court is therefore very relevant. Nonetheless, in 
order to clarify the regime in place, avoid legal uncertainties, and remove the 
risk that optional measures can be implemented only by some EU DGSs, it 
 
72 See Marco Bodellini, 'To Bail-In, or to Bail-Out, That Is the Question' (2018) 19 
European Business Organization Law Review 377. 
73 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 5, pointing out that since article 11 
paragraph 3 of the DGSD provides that since 'the DGS shall consult the resolution 
authority and the competent authority on the measures and the conditions 
imposed on the credit institution, it might be appropriate to provide for an explicit 
pro-active role in this regard in favour of the DGS when packaging the entire 
intervention, also in order to clarify the roles and responsibilities of each player 
involved'. 
74 See Salvatore Maccarone, 'La Sentenza del Tribunale Europeo sul Caso Tercas' 
(2019) 3 Bancaria 20. 
75 Joined Cases T-98/16, T-196/16 and T-198/16 Italian Republic and Others v European 
Commission EU: T:2019:167. 
seems that a review of the 2013 Banking Communication rules on DGS's 
optional measures and state aid provision would be needed.76 
The need for a review of the Banking Communication is based on a number 
of considerations. From a systematic perspective, it is worth noting that the 
main goal of the post-global financial crisis bank crisis management regime 
is, according to the Financial Stability Board 'Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions', to handle a bank's crisis 
without using public money while simultaneously avoiding the creation of 
financial instability.77 This in itself is a very difficult goal to achieve.78 But if 
this is the objective, then it is should be seen as conceptually incoherent to 
render the use of private resources, like the ones of DGSs, more complicated. 
This holds true even when a public authority, such as the banking supervisor 
or the ministry of finance, considers it appropriate to exercise a form of moral 
suasion on the banking industry participants to orchestrate, coordinate, and 
implement an effective solution in the interest of the system as a whole based 
on the intervention of the DGS. Such a position rests on the consideration 
that the use of private resources by definition should not be qualified as state 
aid provision. Even more so, in a context where resources are by nature finite 
and where public intervention is discouraged, any possible privately funded 
solution should be facilitated. Accordingly, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), in its 2018 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for the Euro 
Area, has pointed out that 'deposit and asset transfers funded by DISs could 
 
76 Accordingly, see European Banking Authority (n 45), 81, stating that '[s]ubject to 
the outcome of the Commission's appeal in the Tercas case, the EBA invites the 
Commission to consider if there is a need to amend the Banking Communication 
and the potentially different consequences for DGSs depending on their legal 
status and/or governance structure'. 
77 Financial Stability Board, 'Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for 
Financial Institutions' (2014) <https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
r_141015.pdf> accessed 30 August 2020, 1, stating that the implementation of the 
Key Attributes 'should allow authorities to resolve financial institutions in an 
orderly manner without taxpayer exposure to loss from solvency support, while 
maintaining continuity of their vital economic functions'. 
78 See Biljana Biljanovska, 'Aligning Market Discipline and Financial Stability: A 
More Gradual Shift from Contingent Convertible Capital to Bail-in Measures' 
(2016) 17 European Business Organisation Law Review 105-106, arguing that 
'market discipline and financial stability cannot be achieved simultaneously'. 
likewise be granted a presumption of compliance when provided on a least 
cost basis according to agreed open procedures and subject to European-level 
oversight, thus minimizing competition concerns'.79 
Such a revision of the 2013 Banking Communication rules, based on the 
arguments advanced by the General Court of Justice in the Tercas case, should 
determine that the optional functions implemented by those DGSs that 
comply with the least cost principle do not qualify as state aid measures, 
regardless of their governance arrangements and decision-making process.80 
In this way, the risk of different treatments depending on the legal structure 
of the DGS would be removed and it would also be possible to resolve the 
friction between article 11 of the DGSD, the Banking 2013 Communication 
rules and article 32 of the BRRD, stating that the provision of extraordinary 
public financial support would make the bank FOLF. Indeed, if such 
measures no longer qualify as a state aid provision, their implementation will 
not cause the recipient bank to be considered FOLF and therefore the DGSs 
intervention, as regulated under article 11 of the DGSD, could take place. 
Also, such a review would permit a deviation from the mandatory 
implementation of burden-sharing measures, which, as discussed, in some 
cases might be counterproductive. 
2. The Obstacles Resulting from the Granting to Deposit Guarantee Schemes of a 
Super Priority in the Bank's Liquidation and the Narrow Reading of the 'Least Cost 
Principle' 
The second issue arises from the introduction of the depositor preference 
rule in the BRRD. This super priority, indeed, also applies to DGSs 
subrogating to depositors' rights in the insolvency proceedings. Such a rule, 
 
79 See International Monetary Fund, 'Euro Area Policies, Financial System Stability 
Assessment', (2018) IMF Country Report no. 18/226, 28, 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/07/19/Euro-Area-Policies-
Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-46100> accessed 30 August 2020; similarly 
see European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 25. 
80 Accordingly, see European Banking Authority (n 45), 81, stating that 'Subject to the 
outcome of the Commission's appeal in the Tercas case, the EBA invites the 
Commission to consider if there is a need to amend the Banking Communication 
and the potentially different consequences for DGSs depending on their legal 
status and/or governance structure'. 
coupled with a narrow reading of the 'least cost principle', could end up 
making every DGS optional intervention very difficult, if not impossible. The 
granting of this super priority to DGSs impacts the optional interventions in 
that they are allowed only to the extent that the DGS does not end up 
spending more money than the amount it would have had to pay in order to 
reimburse covered depositors in the context of a piecemeal liquidation 
according to the 'least cost principle'. The critical aspect is that, due to the 
super priority, it is unlikely that the DGS will be called on to bear losses at all. 
This could occur only when losses are so significant that all the other 
liabilities ranked below deposits are not enough to absorb them.  
It is true that when only focusing on a single crisis, the DGS might seem 
better off as it will recover all (or a relevant part of) the resources provided to 
reimburse the affected covered depositors, due to the extension of the 
depositor preference. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily the best possible 
outcome for the system,81 which would be the overall cheapest and safest 
solution, also taking into account the interests of taxpayers.82 Yet, due to the 
depositor preference extended to DGSs, it will be almost impossible for them 
to provide any form of assistance aimed at preventing the bank's failure as 
well as to finance measures in the context of liquidation, in contrast with the 
US framework.83 As a result, typically only a piecemeal liquidation can take 
place, which will cause the destruction of much more value, negatively 
affecting both the other unsecured creditors and potentially the banking 
system as whole. Indeed, a disorderly liquidation can trigger a crisis of 
confidence, entailing massive shifts of deposits across institutions, and in 
 
81 See Alessandra De Aldisio and others, 'Towards a Framework for Orderly 
Liquidation of Banks in the EU' (Notes on Financial Stability and Supervision of Banca 
d'Italia 2019), 6, who use an example to demonstrate that even when an optional 
measure implemented by the DGS ends up being more expensive for it than 
depositors pay-out, such a strategy is typically more effective from a system-wide 
perspective. 
82 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 25. 
83 See Fernando Restoy, 'How to Improve Crisis Management in the Banking Union: 
a European FDIC?' (2019) CIRSF Annual International Conference on 'Financial 
Supervision and Financial Stability 10 Years after the Crisis: Achievements and 
Next Steps', Lisbon 4 July 2019, 4, <https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp190715.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2020. 
particularly serious situations even deposit runs. Should the crisis spread to 
other banks as well, then the costs for the DGS of reimbursing covered 
depositors could become much higher than originally foreseen.84 Even more 
interestingly, piecemeal liquidation often would be neither beneficial for the 
system nor in the interest of the DGS itself. This is because the interest of 
the banking system and the interest of the DGS are typically aligned. Since 
the interest of the DGS is the interest of its members, which are the banks 
composing the banking system, the interest of the DGS is the interest of the 
banking system at large.  
Moving from this assumption, the 'least cost principle' should be rethought 
in light of the overarching interest of the system and without just considering 
the cost paid by the DGS in performing optional measures in the crisis 
concerned.85 Therefore, the amount to be paid should be compared to the 
sum of direct and indirect costs for the banking system – and potentially for 
the real economy – arising from an atomistic liquidation.86 In other words, 
disregarding the 'indirect costs' for the system would lead to a partial result 
which is not able to point out the best possible solution.  
This reading of the rules, in turn, is in line with the rationale behind the 
DGSD, which clearly provides the possibility for DGSs to intervene by 
carrying out optional measures.87 It would be irrational to provide such a 
 
84 See De Aldisio and others (n 81), 9. 
85 On this see European Banking Authority (n 45), 81, stating that 'There is a need to 
provide more clarity on how to assess that: the costs of the measures do not exceed 
the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandate of the DGS (as per 
Article 11(3)); the costs borne by the DGS do not exceed the net amount of 
compensating covered depositors at the credit institution concerned' (as per 
Article 11(6)). There is also a need for more clarity on what kind of costs should be 
taken into account in the abovementioned assessments (only direct or also indirect 
costs – and what costs constitute indirect costs), particularly because the current 
lack of clarity poses the risk that different authorities will take different 
approaches to the least cost assessment; such clarifications should be made in a 
legal product that provides sufficient legal certainty for DGSs'. 
86 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 6. 
87 According to recital 16 of the DGSD 'It should also be possible, where permitted 
under national law, for a DGS to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and to 
use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit 
 
possibility and then to introduce other rules in different legislative acts 
substantially hindering the performance of such measures. Furthermore, this 
is the very essence of the Financial Stability Board's 'Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes' that require authorities to resolve FOLF 
banks without using public money, while avoiding the creation of negative 
systemic effects.88 Given that the resources of a DGS are those provided by 
the banks, their use in handling crises should be facilitated on the grounds 
that otherwise the whole system, and thereby the public, could be negatively 
affected. 
Accordingly, the scope of the least cost principle should be enlarged in order 
to enable the performance of system-wide driven solutions based on the 
DGSs' optional interventions, since, as it is, the legislative framework makes 
a strategy that is often not efficient (i.e. a piecemeal liquidation with the 
DGS's reimbursement of covered depositors), the only practically possible 
one. For this proposal to properly work without creating legal uncertainties, 
article 11, paragraph 3 and article 11, paragraph 6 of the DGSD should be 
amended by clearly spelling out how such a revised principle should be 
applied in practice, namely by stating which (direct and indirect) costs should 
be taken into account and compared with the amount of depositor pay-out.      
The counterargument to this line of reasoning could be that a system-wide 
interpretation of the least cost principle would be either arbitrary and 
inaccurate or practically impossible. Nevertheless, in this regard it has been 
stated that even though the calculation of indirect costs would not be easy, 
still according to previous experiences these costs can be material. Therefore, 
a methodology to calculate them could be developed.89  
In any case, if such a different and broader application of the 'least cost 
principle', aimed at taking into account the overarching interest of the 
system, was to be considered as practically impossible, then a more radical 
 
institution with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other 
adverse impacts …'. 
88 See Financial Stability Board (n 77), 1. 
89 In this regard, De Aldisio and others (n 81), 9, argue that 'even if it is more difficult 
to quantify these costs than it is to quantify direct costs, experience shows that they 
can indeed be material, as the history of crises is full of contagion episodes. It would 
not be overly difficult to identify a methodology to estimate these additional costs'. 
solution would be the abolition sic et simpliciter of the extension to the DGSs 
of the super priority in the exercise of their subrogation rights within the 
insolvency proceedings.90 In substantive terms, the result would be the same, 
as DGSs would be allowed to also perform the optional measures under 
article 11, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the DGSD. Given that the interests of the 
system and the interests of DGSs are equivalent, the latter should not raise 
any opposition to such a legislative amendment, which, in turn, would align 
the EU regime with the US one.91  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
DGSs are a fundamental component of the banking system safety-net. They 
play a pivotal role in maintaining financial stability since they are an ex-ante 
form of protection for depositors, who, due to them, have the guarantee to 
get their covered deposits back in any case. Accordingly, their presence is in 
itself instrumental to keep depositors' confidence in the system and, 
consequently, to maintain its stability. Their essential purpose is the 
performance of the pay-box function that, as such, needs to be included in 
the bank crisis management legal framework. Yet, the optional functions (i.e. 
the implementation of alternative measures aimed at preventing a bank's 
failure and the provision of financial means in the context of liquidation 
aimed at preserving access of depositors to covered deposits) might be even 
more effective, from a system-wide perspective, in maintaining financial 
stability and reducing the destruction of value potentially resulting from a 
piecemeal liquidation procedure, than the pay-box function.  
In this regard, the possibility for a DGS to intervene in the face of the first 
symptoms of a crisis can turn out to be particularly effective to avoid that the 
latter further escalates by getting out of control. In fact, many banking crises, 
still at an early stage, can be more efficiently handled through a DGS 
intervention aimed at helping the restructuring of the institutions 
concerned. Likewise, the ability of DGSs to provide financial assistance in 
the context of a bank's liquidation might render this process orderly and 
 
90 Ibid 8, arguing that 'to broaden the number of cases in which the DGS may carry 
out alternative interventions, the super-priority rule could be eliminated for 
subrogated DGSs (it could still be applied to insured depositors)'. 
91 See Restoy (n 83), 4. 
effective. That is why the role of DGSs should not be limited to just 
performing the pay-box function. In this regard, moving from the analysis of 
the effectiveness of the optional functions in some Member States and 
relying on empirical data resulting from surveys conducted by EFDI and 
EBA, this paper has advanced the argument that the implementation of the 
optional functions should not be hindered, but rather facilitated. In this vein, 
each EU Member State should be encouraged (indeed required) to transpose 
in its domestic framework the provisions under article 11, paragraphs 3 and 6 
of DGSD regulating the DGSs optional measures in order for them to be 
empowered to carry out such functions at the early intervention stage as well 
as at the liquidation stage.92  
Still, since currently the implementation of both these functions in the 
Member States is hindered by a number of legislative obstacles, this paper, 
after analysing the legal regime in place, has advanced some reform proposals 
aimed at removing them. Accordingly, with regard to the state aid 
framework, this paper has argued in favour of a revision of the 2013 Banking 
Communication rules aimed at ensuring that the optional functions 
implemented by those DGSs that comply with the least cost principle do not 
qualify as state aid measures, regardless of their governance arrangements and 
decision-making process. In this way, the risk of different treatments 
depending on the legal structure of the DGS would be removed and it would 
also be possible to resolve the friction between article 11 of the DGSD, the 
2013 Banking Communication rules and article 32 of the BRRD, stating that 
the provision of extraordinary public financial support would make the bank 
FOLF. Indeed, if such measures no longer qualify as a state aid provision, 
their implementation will not cause the recipient bank to be considered 
FOLF and therefore the DGSs intervention, as regulated under article 11 of 
the DGSD, could successfully take place. Such a review would also permit a 
deviation from the mandatory implementation of burden sharing measures, 
which in some cases might be counterproductive.  
 
92 See European Forum of Deposit Insurers (n 35), 24, arguing that some EU Member 
States did not transpose into their domestic legal systems the provisions of Article 
11 paragraph 6 of the DGSD due 'to the rigidity of the existing court-based 
insolvency proceedings'. 
In relation to the extension of depositor preference to DGSs and the least 
cost principle, by contrast, this paper has supported a rethinking of the 
principle, bearing in mind the overarching interest of the system and without 
just considering the cost paid by the DGS in performing optional measures 
in the crisis concerned. To do so, the amount to be paid to reimburse covered 
depositors should be compared to the sum of direct and indirect costs for the 
banking system – and potentially for the real economy – arising from an 
atomistic liquidation. Such an approach would enable an implementation of 
the most effective solutions from a system-wide perspective in terms of both 
keeping financial stability and reducing the destruction of value potentially 
arising from atomistic liquidation procedures, thereby leading to the 
adoption of a new bank crisis management paradigm. Such a new bank crisis 
management paradigm would be the result of empowering DGSs both to 
intervene in the face of the first symptoms of a crisis, thereby preventing it 
from escalating, and to provide financial support in the context of a 
liquidation ensuring, in this way, that it is orderly and effective. This, in turn, 
could also pave the way for the establishment of a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS), with a centralised decision-making at European 
level and funding sources mutualised within the Banking Union.93  
 
93 On the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, see Dirk Schoenmaker, 'Building a 
Stable European Deposit Insurance Scheme' (2018) 4 Journal of Financial 
Regulation 314. 
